fix(host-agent): SECURITY — file manager copy/list no longer follow symlinks out of the jail

Automated security review (HIGH) caught a jail-escape my own review
missed: copy_recursive used fs::metadata (follows symlinks). A symlink
inside the jail pointing to e.g. /etc, then a 'copy' of its parent dir,
would dereference it and pull external content INTO the jail where it
could be read — a read-escape exfiltration. jail() validates only the
top-level src/dest; the recursive walk reintroduced the escape.

Fix: copy_recursive uses symlink_metadata and refuses any symlink
('symlinks are not followed across the jail boundary'). list() likewise
switched to symlink_metadata so it reports the link, never the
dereferenced target's size/type (info leak). Two regression tests added:
copy-symlink-exfil (asserts no external content lands inside) and
list-no-deref. 44/44 tests green. Rolled forward to alpha.4 (vulnerable
alpha.3 superseded).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

corrosion-host-agent/tests/filemanager.rs

@@ -347,6 +347,62 @@ fn jail_rejects_chained_symlink_escape() {
     );
 }
 
+/// SECURITY REGRESSION: copying a directory that contains a symlink pointing
+/// OUTSIDE the jail must NOT dereference it and pull external content inside.
+/// jail() validates only the top-level src/dest; the recursive copy must
+/// refuse symlinks itself or it becomes a read-escape exfiltration path.
+#[cfg(unix)]
+#[test]
+fn copy_refuses_to_follow_symlink_out_of_jail() {
+    let dir = tempdir();
+    let root = dir.path();
+    let outside = tempdir();
+    std::fs::write(outside.path().join("secret.txt"), "TOP SECRET")
+        .expect("write external secret");
+
+    // A directory inside the jail containing a symlink to the outside dir.
+    std::fs::create_dir(root.join("src")).expect("mkdir src");
+    std::os::unix::fs::symlink(outside.path(), root.join("src").join("escape"))
+        .expect("plant symlink to outside");
+
+    // Attempt to copy src -> dest (both inside the jail).
+    let err = filemanager::copy(root, "src", "dest")
+        .expect_err("copy must refuse the embedded symlink");
+    assert!(
+        format!("{err:#}").contains("symlink"),
+        "error should name the refused symlink, got: {err:#}"
+    );
+
+    // The external secret must NOT have landed inside the jail.
+    assert!(
+        !root.join("dest").join("escape").join("secret.txt").exists(),
+        "external content leaked into the jail via symlink-following copy",
+    );
+}
+
+/// `list` must report a symlink as the link itself, never the dereferenced
+/// target — otherwise it leaks the size/type of files outside the jail.
+#[cfg(unix)]
+#[test]
+fn list_does_not_dereference_symlink_metadata() {
+    let dir = tempdir();
+    let root = dir.path();
+    std::os::unix::fs::symlink(Path::new("/etc/passwd"), root.join("leak"))
+        .expect("plant symlink");
+
+    let entries = filemanager::list(root, "").expect("list root");
+    let leak = entries.iter().find(|e| e.name == "leak").expect("symlink listed");
+    // /etc/passwd is a regular file; if we followed the link, is_dir would
+    // reflect the target. We must report the link, which is not a directory,
+    // and must NOT expose the target's byte size.
+    assert!(!leak.is_dir, "symlink must not be reported as a directory");
+    let target_size = std::fs::metadata("/etc/passwd").map(|m| m.len()).unwrap_or(0);
+    assert!(
+        leak.size != target_size || target_size == 0,
+        "list leaked the symlink target's size ({target_size} bytes)"
+    );
+}
+
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 // Dispatch layer tests
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------