3 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Vantz Stockwell
856106174a fix(nats): no_auth_user is top-level, not inside authorization{} — broke broker startup
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Caught during the live cutover: nats-server rejects 'unknown field
no_auth_user' when it is nested in the authorization block, taking the
whole broker down. Both the generator (open stage) and the committed
bootstrap default emitted it nested. Moved to top level. Enforce-stage
output was unaffected (no no_auth_user), which is what the live broker
now runs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-11 12:47:14 -04:00
Vantz Stockwell
463908b18e fix(nats): security review — secure-by-default + per-tenant inbox isolation
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Two HIGH findings from automated review on the generator, both fixed:
1. Cross-tenant inbox access: per-license users were granted _INBOX.>,
   letting license A subscribe to license B's request-reply responses.
   Now scoped to corrosion.{license}.> ONLY; replies must ride the
   license namespace (corrosion.{license}.reply.<id>) — documented in
   PROTOCOL.md. Agent unchanged (responds to msg.reply); constraint is
   on the requester (internal user has full >).
2. Default-open auth bypass: generator defaulted to stage=open with a
   full-access anonymous user — a stale regen left the broker wide open.
   Now defaults to enforce (secure by default); the explicit 'open'
   migration stage maps anonymous to a harmless corrosion.unclaimed.>
   namespace, never real tenant subjects. Committed bootstrap default
   hardened the same way.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-11 12:39:31 -04:00
Vantz Stockwell
00cff51ce5 feat(nats): per-license auth mechanism — agent user/password, scoped broker, generator (non-breaking)
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Closes the open broker (anonymous publish to any tenant's corrosion.*).
Per-license isolation via NATS user/password + subject permissions:
each license -> user=license_id, password=HMAC-SHA256(license_id,
NATS_TOKEN_SECRET), scoped to corrosion.{license_id}.> + _INBOX. Backend
uses a privileged internal user.

- Agent (alpha.5): nats_user/nats_password config + env, user_and_password
  auth; falls back to token/anonymous (transition-safe)
- Backend: connects with NATS_INTERNAL_USER/PASSWORD when set, else anon
- scripts/generate-nats-auth.mjs: regenerates nats-auth.conf from the
  licenses table; NATS_AUTH_STAGE=open keeps a no_auth_user fallback
  (verify creds first), =enforce rejects anonymous
- committed nats-auth.conf is the SAFE OPEN default (no secrets); the
  host copy carries real users and is not committed
- compose: NATS_INTERNAL_USER/PASSWORD/NATS_TOKEN_SECRET, mount nats-auth.conf

Entirely non-breaking until secrets+config deployed; staged cutover next.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-11 12:33:27 -04:00