Agent only ever runs a binary whose minisign signature verifies against
the EMBEDDED public key. NATS host.cmd func 'update' {url}: download
binary + .minisig from the CDN -> verify against embedded pubkey ->
atomic swap (.old rollback) -> relaunch. URL allowlist (https + cdn.
corrosionmgmt.com only, rejects userinfo-bypass), 100MiB cap. Closes the
supply-chain hole: even a malicious CDN upload can't run unsigned.
CI: build-host-agent.yml signs every artifact with MINISIGN_SECRET_KEY
(Gitea secret) and publishes .minisig alongside; the step FAILS the
build if the secret is absent (refuses to ship unsigned). Bumped to
alpha.6.
6 deterministic tests (accept valid / reject tampered+garbage+empty sig,
URL allowlist incl userinfo-bypass, atomic swap+rollback). Fixtures
signed with the real release key so tests need no key at runtime. Full
suite 50/50 green; musl + native build clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
New corrosion-host-agent/ crate (Go companion-agent stays as behavior
reference until parity). Wire protocol v2 per COA-B: instance-scoped
subjects corrosion.{license}.{instance}.* + host-level .host.* — spec
in PROTOCOL.md, designed for the license->host->instance fleet model.
- Multi-instance TOML config in the foundation, not retrofitted
- NATS layer on the Vigilance production profile (infinite reconnect,
capped backoff, 30s ping, 8192-msg offline buffer)
- Heartbeat with real sysinfo telemetry — Go agent shipped hardcoded
disk/cpu placeholders; this is the panel's first true Resources data
- Connectivity prober (outbound TCP, periodic + on-demand)
- Host cmd channel (ping/probe/sysinfo), going-offline beacon,
CancellationToken shutdown
- Live-fire verified against production NATS; artifacts: 3.7MB static
linux-musl, 3.8MB windows .exe (static CRT)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
