Two HIGH findings from automated review on the generator, both fixed:
1. Cross-tenant inbox access: per-license users were granted _INBOX.>,
letting license A subscribe to license B's request-reply responses.
Now scoped to corrosion.{license}.> ONLY; replies must ride the
license namespace (corrosion.{license}.reply.<id>) — documented in
PROTOCOL.md. Agent unchanged (responds to msg.reply); constraint is
on the requester (internal user has full >).
2. Default-open auth bypass: generator defaulted to stage=open with a
full-access anonymous user — a stale regen left the broker wide open.
Now defaults to enforce (secure by default); the explicit 'open'
migration stage maps anonymous to a harmless corrosion.unclaimed.>
namespace, never real tenant subjects. Committed bootstrap default
hardened the same way.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
97 lines
4.3 KiB
JavaScript
97 lines
4.3 KiB
JavaScript
#!/usr/bin/env node
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// Generate corrosion-nats authorization config from the licenses table.
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//
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// Per-license isolation without auth-callout: each license maps to a NATS user
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// (user = license UUID, password = HMAC-SHA256(license_id, NATS_TOKEN_SECRET))
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// whose publish/subscribe is restricted to corrosion.{license_id}.> (+ _INBOX
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// for request-reply). The backend uses a privileged internal user.
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//
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// STAGING (NATS_AUTH_STAGE env) — defaults to "enforce" (secure by default):
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// "enforce" (default) — no anonymous; unauthenticated connections rejected.
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// "open" — EXPLICIT opt-in for a brief migration window. Maps
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// anonymous to a HARMLESS namespace (corrosion.unclaimed.>),
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// NEVER full access, so a stale "open" deploy cannot
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// read or forge real tenant (corrosion.{uuid}.>) traffic.
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//
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// REPLY SUBJECTS: per-license users are scoped to corrosion.{license}.> ONLY —
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// no _INBOX grant (that would let one license read another's request-reply
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// responses). Backend→agent request-reply MUST therefore use a reply subject
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// inside the license namespace, e.g. corrosion.{license}.reply.<id>, not the
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// default global _INBOX. The agent simply responds to msg.reply, so no agent
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// change is needed — the constraint is on the requester (the internal user has
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// full > and is unaffected).
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//
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// Usage:
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// DATABASE_URL=... NATS_INTERNAL_USER=... NATS_INTERNAL_PASSWORD=... \
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// NATS_TOKEN_SECRET=... NATS_AUTH_STAGE=open node scripts/generate-nats-auth.mjs > docker/nats-auth.conf
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//
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// Re-run and reload NATS (`docker exec corrosion-nats nats-server --signal reload`)
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// whenever licenses change.
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import { createRequire } from 'node:module';
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import { createHmac } from 'node:crypto';
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const require = createRequire(new URL('../backend-nest/x.js', import.meta.url));
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const { Client } = require('pg');
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const {
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DATABASE_URL,
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NATS_INTERNAL_USER,
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NATS_INTERNAL_PASSWORD,
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NATS_TOKEN_SECRET,
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NATS_AUTH_STAGE = 'enforce',
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} = process.env;
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for (const [k, v] of Object.entries({ DATABASE_URL, NATS_INTERNAL_USER, NATS_INTERNAL_PASSWORD, NATS_TOKEN_SECRET })) {
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if (!v) { console.error(`Missing required env: ${k}`); process.exit(2); }
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}
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/** Per-license agent password — must match the backend's derivation. */
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export function licensePassword(licenseId, secret) {
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return createHmac('sha256', secret).update(licenseId).digest('hex');
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}
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const esc = (s) => String(s).replace(/\\/g, '\\\\').replace(/"/g, '\\"');
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const main = async () => {
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const pg = new Client({ connectionString: DATABASE_URL });
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await pg.connect();
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const { rows } = await pg.query('SELECT id FROM licenses ORDER BY created_at');
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await pg.end();
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const lines = [];
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lines.push('# GENERATED by scripts/generate-nats-auth.mjs — do not edit by hand.');
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lines.push(`# stage=${NATS_AUTH_STAGE} licenses=${rows.length}`);
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lines.push('authorization {');
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lines.push(' users: [');
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// Privileged internal user — the backend (full corrosion.> + _INBOX + _SYS).
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lines.push(` { user: "${esc(NATS_INTERNAL_USER)}", password: "${esc(NATS_INTERNAL_PASSWORD)}", permissions: { publish: ">", subscribe: ">" } }`);
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// Per-license scoped users — corrosion.{id}.> ONLY. No _INBOX grant:
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// replies ride the license namespace (see header). This is the whole
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// point — one license can never touch another's subjects.
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for (const { id } of rows) {
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const pw = licensePassword(id, NATS_TOKEN_SECRET);
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const scope = `corrosion.${id}.>`;
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lines.push(
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` { user: "${esc(id)}", password: "${esc(pw)}", permissions: { ` +
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`publish: { allow: ["${scope}"] }, ` +
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`subscribe: { allow: ["${scope}"] } } }`,
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);
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}
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if (NATS_AUTH_STAGE === 'open') {
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// EXPLICIT migration opt-in only. Anonymous gets a HARMLESS namespace —
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// never real tenant subjects — so a stale "open" deploy leaks nothing.
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lines.push(' { user: "anonymous", password: "", permissions: { publish: { allow: ["corrosion.unclaimed.>"] }, subscribe: { allow: ["corrosion.unclaimed.>"] } } }');
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}
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lines.push(' ]');
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if (NATS_AUTH_STAGE === 'open') {
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lines.push(' no_auth_user: "anonymous"');
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}
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lines.push('}');
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process.stdout.write(lines.join('\n') + '\n');
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};
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main().catch((e) => { console.error(e); process.exit(1); });
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